Arbitral proceedings are governed by the principle of freedom of form, so that, where nothing has been stipulated in the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator has the power to regulate the conduct of the proceedings, including by setting peremptory time-limits for the production of evidence, provided that the parties were given notice thereof from the outset of the proceedings, thereby safeguarding their right of defence.
In the context of a challenge of an arbitral award, a defect of reasoning, as a ground falling under Article 829(1)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure read in conjunction with Article 823(1)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, is only established where the reasoning of the award is entirely absent or so deficient as to preclude identification of the ratio of the decision, thereby amounting to a non-reasoned award.
In the context of a challenge of an arbitral award, the reference to public policy in Article 829(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure must be interpreted restrictively as a reference limited to the fundamental and mandatory rules of the legal order; it follows that the provision on the burden of proof under Article 2697 of the Civil Code does not constitute a rule of public policy, and its breach does not give rise to nullity of the award.