The nullity or invalidity of the contract containing the arbitration clause is not among the exhaustive grounds for challenging the award listed in art. 829 cod. proc. civ., nor can it be brought within the breach of the rules of law governing the merits, which is admissible only where expressly provided by the parties or by statute; a ground so framed is inadmissible.
An arbitration clause which entrusts the appointment of the arbitrator to an institutional third party is not oppressive, the oppressive character not being inferable from the fact that one party does not take part in the designation of the arbitrator.
In arbitral proceedings the failure to observe the principle that both parties be heard is not a formal defect but a defect of conduct, so that, for the award to be declared void, it is necessary to establish a concrete impairment of the right of defence, which the party bears the burden of specifying.
The production of documents pre-existing the arbitral proceedings does not infringe the principle that both parties be heard, it being necessary and sufficient that, following such production, the parties be allowed to inspect the documents and to make submissions; nor is that principle infringed by the failure to order an expert report, this being a choice pertaining to the merits and left to the arbitrator’s assessment.
There is no failure to decide where it appears from the reasons of the award that the arbitrator ruled on the plea, even implicitly and in summary terms, holding it to be unfounded.